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Collins v. State, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 88 (Nov. 22, 2017)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Summary
The court determined that (1) the district court may constitutionally remove a criminal
defendant from the courtroom for disrupting courtroom procedure, (2) a defendant does not have
the right to appear at trial in shackles, (3) testimony about a detective’s investigation leading to
the defendant’s arrest is not opinion about the defendant’s guilt, (4) the district court may decide
not to instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense if no evidence on the record establishes an
element of that offense, and (5) a specific cause of death is not required to find that a person’s
death was caused by criminal agency.
Background
Police officers and detectives tied Collins to the robbery and death of Brandi Payton
because the two were acquainted, Collins was found with several of Payton’s belongings, and
Payton’s blood was found at Collins’s girlfriend’s house and in a rental car in Collins’s possession.
Autopsy evidence could not reveal Payton’s cause of death. The only evidence of Collins’s
potential provocation or passion was a statement introduced by Collins to a third party that Collins
believed he should delete text messages between him and Payton because investigators might
believe he “had something to do with” Payton’s death.
At Collins’s trial, Collins refused to allow his shackles to be removed or change into
civilian clothes despite repeated advice from counsel and the court that it was in his best interest
to do so. The district court informed Collins that he had the choice to comply and remove his
shackles or voluntarily waive his right to be present at trial. Collins refused both options and was
removed from the courtroom after officers attempted to forcibly remove his shackles. After Collins
had been removed from the courtroom, the court and counsel excused jurors for hardship, statutory
ineligibility, and language barrier reasons. Collins was present for substantive voir dire and later
parts of the trial.
At trial, Detective Mogg testified that his investigation of Payton’s murder lead him to
arrest Collins in response to assertions by Collins that the investigation was deficient and excluded
other potential suspects. Mogg referenced interviews with individuals who participated in the trial
as witnesses. All facts referenced in Mogg’s testimony were in evidence at the time of his
testimony or were later introduced as evidence.
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Discussion
II.
A.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at every stage of a trial2, but
may lose such right and be removed from the courtroom if, after being properly warned of the
consequences, he or she disrupts the courtroom proceedings.3 In order to remove a criminal
defendant for disruption, the district court must 1) advise the defendant of proper courtroom
decorum, 2) warn the defendant that disruption will result in a waiver of the right to be present, 3)
determine whether a lesser measure will properly remedy the defendant’s behavior, and 4) allow
the defendant an opportunity to return if he or she promises to refrain from further disruption. 4
Further, Collins was only removed for administrative voir dire, which does not involve the
defendant confronting witnesses against him or her and is not substantive enough to present a due
process concern.5
B.
Removal decisions are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.6 Here, the district
court decided that Collins’s refusal to allow officers to remove his shackles undermined the
decorum of the courtroom because it created an unacceptable risk of juror prejudice. 7 While a
defendant may waive his or her right to not be tried in prison clothes8, this does not give the
defendant the right to demand to be tried in prison clothes9 or to disrespect the court and the jury
by defying court orders.10
III.
A.
A witness may not give a direct opinion as to whether the defendant is guilty or innocent.11
However, this does not mean that witnesses may not give any testimony implying that they believe
the defendant is guilty, or from which a juror could infer that belief. 12 The detective’s statements
2

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985); see NEV. CONST.
art. I, § 8.
3
Allen, 397 U.S. at 343; see NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.387(1)(c) (2017).
4
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES § 5.01 (6th ed. 2013) (interpreting FED. R.
CRIM. P. 43(c)); see NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.387.
5
See Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526; United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2002).
6
United States v. Hellems, 866 F.3d 856, 863–64 (8th Cir. 2017); cf. Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001–02,
946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997).
7
See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630–31 (2005); State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 163, 165 P.2d 389, 409 (1946).
8
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 521 (1976).
9
Deck, 544 U.S. at 631.
10
See United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2015); LaGon v. State, 778 S.E.2d 32, 41 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2015).
11
See Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 669, 6 P.3d 481, 485 (2000).
12
See Ogden v. State, 34 P.3d 271, 277 (Wyo. 2001).
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about his investigation and the reasons he arrested Collins did not even imply that he believed
Collins had committed the crime, merely that there was enough evidence to arrest Collins which
requires a different standard of proof.13 Mogg’s testimony also did not improperly circumvent
hearsay or relevance requirements for evidence because he did not testify about the contents of the
other witnesses’ statements and his testimony was submitted to rebut Collins’s assertion that the
investigation was inadequate.
B.
Criminal defendants are entitled to jury instructions on lesser-included offenses only if
there is any evidence to reasonably support it.14 This restriction prevents juries from returning
unsupported “compromise verdicts” for sympathetic defendants.15 Voluntary manslaughter is a
lesser-included offense of murder16 requiring that the person killing be provoked by the person
killed or excited into an irresistible passion.17 The district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that Collins’s comments about his conversation with Payton was insufficient to show
passion or provocation.
C.
A conviction is only overturned for lack of substantial evidence if any rational factfinder
could not find the essential elements of the crime at hand beyond a reasonable doubt on the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecutor.18 One essential element of murder
is that a person’s death was caused by the criminal agency of another person.19 However, the
prosecution need not prove the specific cause of death to prove that death was the result of criminal
agency.20 The court determined that the evidence taken together could lead a rational factfinder to
find Payton’s death was caused by criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
The district court’s removal of Collins for procedural voir dire did not infringe on his
constitutional rights because Collins did not have a right to demand to appear in court in his
shackles and prison clothes. Detective Mogg’s testimony about his investigation and arrest of
Collins was properly included because it was relevant, did not violate rules against hearsay, and
was not opinion about Collins’s guilt. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Collins’s conviction of first degree murder was
supported by sufficient evidence. The court affirmed Collins’s conviction in district court.
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See Commonwealth v. Luciano, 944 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011).
Rosas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258, 1265, 147 P.3d 1101, 1106 (2006).
Id. at 1106, 147 P.3d at 1265.
Williams v. State, 99 Nev. 530, 531, 665 P.2d 260, 261 (1983).
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.040 to 200.060 (2017).
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992).
West v. State, 119 Nev. 410, 415–16, 75 P.3d 808, 812 (2003).
Id. at 418, 75 P.3d at 813; accord Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1103, 968 P.2d 296, 306 (1998).
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